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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No.  09-4178 
____________ 
 
DAVID T. BREAKWELL; CHRISTINE A. BREAKWELL, 
 




ALLEGHENY COUNTY DEPARTEMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF 
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILY SERVICES; ALEXIS ANN SAMULSKI; LINDA 
DEDOMINICIS; TERA TERLECKI in their individual capacities 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cv-00389) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 19, 2010 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  October 22, 2010) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
David and Christine Breakwell appeal the District Court’s grant of summary 





employees of the County’s Office of Children, Youth, and Families (CYF).  We will 
affirm. 
I.  
Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts and we do so, 
as we must, in the light most favorable to the Breakwells. 
The Breakwells are F.B.’s paternal grandparents and have had physical custody of 
her since October 15, 2005.  On December 14, 2005, following the arrests of both of 
F.B.’s parents, Judge Kim Berkeley Clark entered an emergency shelter order granting 
the Breakwells temporary custody of F.B. and suspending visitations between F.B. and 
her parents.  On January 27, 2006, CYF attorney Alexis Samulski filed an Amended 
Petition for Dependency on behalf of F.B. and her brother, as well as their two half-
siblings. 
Judge Clark dismissed the dependency petition on May 22, 2006, concluding that 
because the Breakwells stood in loco parentis to F.B., she was not a “dependent” of the 
County.  On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, holding that Judge Clark 
“erred in dismissing appellant’s dependency petition based on its finding that appellants 
stood in loco parentis to the subject child.”  The Breakwells were awarded permanent 
custody of F.B. by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on June 5, 2008. 
Before the Breakwells were awarded permanent custody, CYF caseworker Tara 







sion of F.B. 
times.  During one of those visits on July 19, 2006, DeDominicis “had her hand on the 
door and kind of pulled to step in” before the Breakwells denied DeDominicis and 
Terlecki entry into their home.  The Breakwells also allege that CYF threatened to 
remove F.B. from their home if they did not reinstitute visitation between F.B. and her 
mother, a directive which would have violated Judge Clark’s emergency shelter order 
requiring prior court approval for any such visits. 
The Breakwells sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Terlecki, 
DeDominicis, Samulski, and Allegheny County violated their First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The gravamen of the Breakwells’ claim is 
straightforward:  once they took physical custody of F.B. pursuant to a family 
agreement,1 they stood in loco parentis to her, which forever precluded CYF from 
treating F.B. as a “dependent” of the County.  The Breakwells argue that CYF violat
their rights to privacy, family integrity, and substantive due process by conducting regular
home visits, insisting upon visitations, and initiating dependency hearings absent any 
allegation of unfitness in their care or supervi
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the Magistrate Judge 
issued a Report and Recommendation in favor of the County Defendants.  The 





                                                                                                                                                            
Judge and held:  (1) Terlecki, DeDominicis, and Samulski were protected by absolute and 
qualified immunity; (2) Allegheny County committed no constitutional violation by 
failing to train employees on the rights of in loco parentis custodians; and (3) the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine required that it abstain from reviewing the Superior Court’s decision 
reversing Judge Clark’s holding that in loco parentis status is determinative in 
dependency proceedings. 
II. 
The District Court found that because Terlecki, DeDominicis, and Samulski 
(collectively, the Individual Defendants) were acting in a “prosecutorial role” in 
instituting dependency proceedings on behalf of F.B., they were absolutely immune from 
liability.  The Breakwells claim this was error because they themselves were not the 
subjects of the dependency proceeding.  Even if the Individual Defendants were acting in 
a prosecutorial role in initiating dependency proceedings, the Breakwells contend the 
Individual Defendants were acting outside of that role when they failed to abide by court 
orders and when they attempted to forcibly enter the Breakwells’ home. 
“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently held that [42 U.S.C. § 1983] did not 
abolish long-standing common law immunities from civil suits.”  Ernst v. Child & Youth 
Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 493 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 
 
1 It is unclear whether F.B.’s biological mother assented to the custodial 





                                                                                                                                                            
478, 484 (1991)).  In Ernst, we held that social workers are “entitled to absolute immunity 
for their actions in petitioning and in formulating and making recommendations to the 
state court because those actions are analogous to functions performed by state 
prosecutors, who were immune from suit at common law.” 108 F.3d at 493.  But we do 
not “accord absolute immunity to ‘investigative or administrative’ actions taken by child 
welfare workers outside the context of a judicial proceeding.” Ernst, 108 F.3d at 497 n.7. 
The functions performed by child welfare workers in initiating dependency 
proceedings are analogous to those that prosecutors perform.  Just as a prosecutor has 
absolute immunity for conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 
criminal process,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), so too are caseworkers 
and CYF attorneys immune when initiating dependency actions.  Ernst, 108 F.3d at 495.  
Because the Breakwells’ claims against attorney Samulski are based solely on her actions 
as counsel for CYF during the dependency proceedings, we will affirm the District 
Court’s summary judgment in favor of Samulski on all of the Breakwells’ claims against 
her. 
III. 
As for Terlecki and DeDominicis, we agree with the Breakwells that these CYF 
employees are not absolutely immune under Ernst because they acted outside the scope of 
the judicial process during home visits and while supervising visitations between F.B. and 
 





her biological mother.  We therefore turn to the question of whether Terlecki and 
DeDominicis are entitled to qualified immunity. 
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  To determine whether Terlecki and DeDominicis 
are entitled to qualified immunity, we must first determine if the Breakwells have 
adequately alleged a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly 
established at the time of their alleged conduct.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001).  “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly 
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 
unlawful in the situation he confronted.”  Id. at 202.  Because this inquiry “must be 
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case,” a court must consider the state of 
the existing law at the time of the alleged violation.  See Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 
425, 431 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The Breakwells allege three constitutional violations: (1) CYF’s interference in the 
Breakwells’ in loco parentis arrangement violated their First Amendment rights to 
familial association and integrity; (2) Terlecki’s and DeDominicis’s regular inspections of 
the Breakwells’ home (and on one occasion, an attempted unconsented-to intrusion) 





seizures; and (3) the cumulative actions of Terlecki and DeDominicis, including threats to 
remove F.B. if the Breakwells did not continue visitations with F.B.’s mother, violated 
their Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy, to maintaining custody of F.B., to familial 
association and integrity, and to substantive due process.  We address each argument in 
turn. 
A. 
The Breakwells contend that Pennsylvania state law treats an in loco parentis 
relationship “exactly the same as [the relationship] between parent and child.”  T.B. v. 
L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).  Like natural parents, the Breakwells claim to have a 
fundamental liberty interest in “the care, custody, and control” of F.B., an interest which 
may not be compromised absent “some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to 
a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.” 
Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
We have never held that those standing in loco parentis to a child have a 
constitutional right to the continued care and supervision of that child.  The Breakwells 
cite Moore v. City of E. Cleveland for the proposition that the “ambit of constitutional 
protection accorded the family extends beyond the relationship of birth parents and 
child.”  431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).  Although Moore recognizes family members’ 





                                                
family member an award of custody whenever a child’s natural parents are subject to an 
investigation for allegations of abuse or neglect.  See Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125 (holding 
that even for natural parents, the right to custody is not “absolute” and must be balanced 
against “the compelling interests of the state in protecting children from abuse”). 
The Breakwells claim the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in T.B. v. 
L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001)), clearly establishes that a natural parent has the same 
“rights and liabilities” as a “person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with 
the child and provided care, nurture, and affection” for that child.  Id. at 917.  However, 
the holding in T.B. v. L.R.M. addresses only the right of an in loco parentis guardian to 
seek custody of a child for visitation purposes.2  Id. at 920.  Pennsylvania law regarding 
the rights of in loco parentis guardians during dependency proceedings is less clear.  
Compare In the Interest of DK, 922 A.2d 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (extending T.B.’s 
reasoning to dependency cases), with In the Interest of L.C., 900 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2006) (following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in In Re Davis, 465 A.2d 
614 (Pa. 1983), which held that Pennsylvania statutory law3 prohibits consideration of in 
 
 2 Even in custody disputes, however, the rights of in loco parentis guardians are 
more limited than the rights of natural parents.  While in loco parentis guardians must be 
given “the opportunity to litigate fully the issue of whether that relationship should be 
maintained,” T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d at 917, in loco parentis status “does not elevate a 
third party to parity with a natural parent in determining the merits of custody dispute.”  
Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
 





                                                                                                                                                            
loco parentis status in dependency proceedings); In the Interest of C.B. and A.L, 861 A.2d 
287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (same).  Thus, the rights of an in loco parentis guardian to the 
continued care and supervision of a “dependent” child is far from “clearly established” 
under state law. 
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in holding that Terlecki and 
DeDominicis were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim. 
B. 
The Breakwells claim CYF violated their Fourth Amendment rights by conducting 
four home visits over the course of two-and-a-half years, which included one attempt to 
enter their residence without their consent.  We disagree. 
On October 15, 2005, the Breakwells assented to an emergency home visit after 
assuming physical custody of F.B.  They agreed to a second visit on January 12, 2006, 
 
guardian or legal custodian.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has stated that “[t]here is no indication that the legislature intended 
‘parents’ to include anything other than natural, blood relationship parents, and adoptive 
parents.”  In Re Davis, 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983); In the Interest of C.B. and A.L, 861 A.2d 
287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“Davis stands for the sound proposition that the doctrine of in 
loco parentis should not be employed when determining whether a child has a parent for 
purposes of determining whether the child is dependent and thus, whether agency 
involvement should be initiated.”).  Moreover, while the Juvenile Act defines a 
“custodian” as one “who stands in loco parentis to the child,” several state courts have 
construed the term “legal custodian” narrowly, as a person who is “awarded custody 
pursuant to a Court order.”  In re F.B., 927 A.2d 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).  CYF’s 
narrow reading of “legal custodian” is therefore consistent with the state’s “fundamental 
precept that the Juvenile Act should be interpreted to accord the most protection to 





                                                                                                                                                            
after Judge Clark granted them temporary custody.  A third consensual visit took place on 
January 27, 2006.  Finally, on July 19, 2006, Terlecki and DeDominicis made an 
unannounced visit, but the Breakwells refused to consent to another inspection, so 
Terlecki and DeDominicis departed.  Prior to being denied entry, DeDominicis “had her 
hand on the door and kind of pulled to step in.”  App. 169–70. 
Viewing the foregoing facts in the light most favorable to the Breakwells, we have  
little trouble concluding that the District Court did not err in finding no Fourth 
Amendment violation.  The first three home visits do not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment because they were consensual.  United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 388 
(3d Cir. 2005).  As for the final visit, Terlecki and DeDominicis were denied entry to the 
Breakwell home, so no “search” occurred.  United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 
(1976). 
C. 
The Breakwells next contend that when taken together, the Individual Defendants’ 
and the County’s actions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The District Court 
concluded that the record did not support a finding that Defendants’ conduct was “so 
arbitrary” that it “can properly be said to shock the conscience.”  Miller v. City of Phila., 







As we have explained, the initiation of dependency proceedings on behalf of F.B., 
her brother, and two half-siblings did not violate the Breakwells’ rights to familial 
integrity and association.  Nor was there an unreasonable “search or seizure” of the 
Breakwells’ home.  Thus, the only conduct which could theoretically present a colorable 
constitutional claim was CYF’s planning and supervision of visits between F.B. and her 
mother in violation of Judge Clark’s December 14, 2005 order that “visits be suspended 
[between F.B. and her parents] until further order.” 
Indeed, the record indicates that between February and April of 2006, CYF 
arranged several visits with F.B.’s mother in violation of Judge Clark’s December 2005 
order.  See App. 245–46.  The fact that these visits were not previously authorized by 
Judge Clark, however, does not alone support a finding of conduct so arbitrary as to give 
rise to a colorable Fourteenth Amendment claim.  All visits between F.B. and her mother 
were supervised by CYF employees at either the CYF Regional Office or the Center for 
Creative Play.  Id.  Moreover, the record shows that CYF caseworkers communicated 
regularly with the Breakwells regarding the times, locations, and types of supervision 
available for these visits.  Id.  Because Terlecki and DeDominicis developed a reasonable 
visitation plan that did not expose F.B. or the Breakwells to any significant risk of harm, 
their conduct did not “shock the conscience” and the Breakwells’ Fourteenth Amendment 





In sum, the District Court did not err when it found that Terlecki and DeDominicis 
were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
D. 
 Absent any constitutional violation, the Breakwell’s Monell claim against 
Allegheny County necessarily fails.  See Grazier v. City of Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“There cannot be an ‘award of damages against a municipal corporation based 
on the actions of . . . its officers when in fact . . . the officer[s] inflicted no constitutional 
harm.’”). 
IV. 
 For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Because we affirm the judgment on these grounds, we need not discuss the District 
Court’s analysis under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. 
